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ABSTRACT
Canada has been both blessed and cursed by its vast resource wealth. Immense resource riches
send the wrong message to the political class that thinking and planning for tomorrow is un-
necessary when record high global prices drive economic development at a frenetic pace.
Short-termism, the loss of manufacturing competitiveness (‘the Dutch disease’) and long term
rent-seeking behavior from the corporate sector become, by default, the low policy standard.
This article contends that Canada is not a simple offshoot ofAnglo-American, hyper-commercial
capitalism, but is subject to the recurring dynamics of social Canada and for this reason the
Northern market model of capitalism needs its own theoretical articulation. Its distinguishing
characteristic is that there is a large and growing role for mixed goods and non-negotiable goods
in comparison to the United States even when the proactive role of the Canadian state had its
wings clipped to a degree that stunned many observers. The article also examines the uncou-
pling of the Canadian and U.S. economies driven in part by the global resource boom. The
downside of the new staples export strategy is that hundreds of thousands of jobs have
disappeared fromOntario and Quebec. Ontario, once the rich “have” province of the Confede-
ration, is now a poor cousin eligible for equalization payments. Unlike earlier waves of dein-
dustrialization, there is little prospect for recovering many of these better paying positions.
Without a focused government strategy, the future for Canada’s factory economy is grim. The
final section addresses the dynamics of growing income polarization and its lessons for the fu-
ture. With a global slowdown or worse on the horizon, Canada’s unique combination of mixed
goods and orthodox market-based policies is likely to be unsustainable in its current form.
For countries with a similar endowment, the Northern model is unexportable.
Key words: Canada’s resources, capitalism, Canadian economy, mixed goods, market policies, Canadian
model
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INSTITUTIONAL DIVERGENCE IN NORTH AMERICA1
Mainstream economists have long assumed that Canada and the United States oper-
ate from a shared rulebook because they are highly interdependent, liberal market
economies. Yet studies by John McCallum (1995), John Helliwell (2002), Andrew
Jackson (2002), Keith Banting and Richard Simeon (1997), and Daniel Drache (2004)
have documented the sharp increase in divergent market patterns and practices in
North America. The most stunning difference is the wealth effect of the resource
boom that accounted for 65 percent of all Canada’s goods exports, a figure up from
45 percent in 2002. In the same period manufactured exports fell 17 percent, most
notably for automotive products. By 2008, natural resources, the powerhouse of the
economy, were responsible for almost all the growth in Canada’s export earnings.
Metal mining, energy, forestry, and agriculture are the cornerstone of the spectacu-
lar diversity of Canada’s resource abundance. If Canada is not a simple offshoot of
Anglo-American hyper-commercial capitalism organized around high-tech indus-
tries and finance, the Northern model needs its own theoretical articulation.
The idea that Canada has been experimenting with a different form of capital-
ism is unimaginable to many Canadians and heretical to the economic elites; but
that should not prevent us from considering that in the Northern model, there is a
large and growing role for mixed goods and non-negotiable goods in comparison to
the United States. Mixed goods are really neither fish nor fowl in the classical neo-
liberal paradigm. Pure private goods are those for which there is no collective di-
mension and are consumed by the individual through a market transaction. Pure
public goods are available to all and are not exclusive. Mixed goods are partly ne-
gotiable on the open market, partly reliant on public regulation, and critically deliv-
ered by the state through its vast array of social and transfer programs to businesses
and millions of Canadian families with their indirect and shared benefits.2
Few Canadian experts have focused their attention on the social market for
mixed goods and its consequences for Canada’s economic culture. Goods move
along a continuum from private to public, and mixed goods require multiple actors
and authorities. For example, investment in knowledge has vital social value and
provides many direct benefits for society to respond to global change. The payback
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1 The manuscript for this article was submitted in December 2008 and the text has been updated where pos-
sible. Clearly, it is beyond the reach of the paper to address the collapse of the global financial markets
and the resulting economic turmoil.
2 Adistinction must be made between public services (often mixed goods) and the cost of the infrastructure
required to deliver those services. The proper business of government is much larger and more complex
than mixed goods provision. Services, transfer payments, infrastructure and social goals like home own-
ership, environmental protection, and social equity fall into the mixed goods category.
from non-market activities is very important, and the need to manage the tension
between public need and private interest requires authority to promote the highest
social return rather than allow private actors the maximum opportunity for rent ex-
traction. It is estimated that the provision for goods in this category is well in excess
of Can$200 billion annually. This is not a precise figure, but it includes universal
health care, social programs, education, monies spent on innovation, employment
insurance (EI), and equalization and other transfers. Health care expenditures by all
levels of government alone totaled Can$160 billion in 2007 (Canadian Institute for
Health Information, 2008). The billions of dollars of mixed goods are a proxy for the
distinctive features of Canada’s Northern model, an immense expenditure that
waxes and wanes according to the business and electoral cycles (Government of
Canada, Department of Finance, 2008).
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLE
This article will make three arguments. In part one, I contend that what is unique
about the Northern model is the institutional demand and provision of mixed
goods, their important redistributive effects for working families and individuals,
and the general expectation from the public that the government, using this potent
lever, will play a large and significant role in the economy. Governments that ignore
this basic expectation do so at their peril. Canadian public policy is, in the vivid con-
ceptual language of Hall and Soskice, a textbook example of a coordinated market
economy not a Hayekian liberal variant. The critical difference is the large regulatory
role of the state in the economy that is increasingly dominated by natural resources
(Hall and Soskice, eds., 2001: 8). Canada’s unique blend of skilled human resources,
a high-wage manufacturing sector, the dynamism of its powerful resource-based
export sector, a modern public infrastructure, a robust financial sector, combined
with macro-economic stability, low inflation, and a union-dominant workplace are
a number of the critical elements that have produced a successful export-oriented
growth strategy and some of the best Canadian public policy practices.
Part two demonstrates the way neoliberal cutbacks and the shrinking of redis-
tributive policies and programs favored private wealth creation to an unprecedent-
ed degree throughout the 1990s. The Canadian state’s proactive role had its wings
clipped to a degree that stunned many observers. Dani Rodrik contends that during
periods of sharp global competition states are pushed either to cut taxes, implement
new labor market reforms and reduce government spending, or sharpen economic
and policy divergence through innovative institutional measures and new spending
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initiatives that create new policy spaces (Rodrik, 2007). Institutions and economic
culture are always the independent variables that matter most, and this is certainly
true in the Canadian case.
Part three examines the way that the uncoupling of the Canadian and U.S. econ-
omies has created new policy spaces, in which national governments have tried
unsuccessfully to restore the balance between market and social Canada. Paradox-
ically, the rebalancing has been helped –and hindered– by the global boom in com-
modity prices for Canada’s energy, mineral, forestry, and agricultural exports (Cross,
2008). With exports of natural resources jumping from 45 percent of all exports in
2002 to nearly 65 percent in 2008, resources are without question king (Cross, 2008).
The downside of the new staples export strategy is that by 2008, with the Canadian
dollar appreciating by more than 40 percent against the U.S. greenback before the
resource boom collapsed in the autumn, hundreds of thousands of jobs had disap-
peared from Ontario and Quebec’s manufacturing industries. Unlike earlier waves
of deindustrialization, with U.S. industry in turmoil, there is little prospect for
recovering many of these better paying positions. The future for Canada’s factory
economy is grim in the absence of a focused industrial and innovation strategy.
Ontario has been downgraded from a “have” to a “have-not” province eligible for
the first time ever for federal equalization payments.
The final section addresses an important issue of the complex dynamics of the
Northern model and growing income polarization and lessons for the future. The
strategic advantage of using a sovereign fund to protect core industries, mastering
the knowledge economy and implementing tax reform all depend on increasing the
flow of mixed and public goods. The curse of Canada’s resource model is short-term-
ism, not having to think and plan for the future very much. The rents from resource
industries are so large that they support a deep culture of complacency about the
environment and give the advantage to short-term profit-taking strategies. While ex-
perience teaches that economic models are not for export, Canada’s example needs
to be put under the microscope for both its best and worst practices. It is not sus-
tainable over the long term.
THE ECONOMIC CULTURE OF THE NORTHERN MODEL
In his pioneering study Capitalism vs. Capitalism, Michel Albert developed the high-
ly intriguing thesis that there are two generalized models of the modern market
economy that many experts accept as a given in the global economy. The first is the
Anglo-American liberal model with its highly competitive labor markets, low taxes,
declining real wage rates for the industrial non-unionized blue collar and contin-
gent work force, a declining middle class, and a low level of government transfers.
The second is the German social democratic model, characterized by high taxes, a
high-skill labor market, high wages, and a world powerhouse of global exports. In
the global North, capitalism has at least two well documented distinct faces with
very different personalities. The American model, based on individual entrepre-
neurship and corporate success, is always driven by short-term financial gain. By
contrast, the German model, with its bent for regulation and the power of its insti-
tutions, stresses collective success, the need for consensus, and the importance of
maintaining long-term strategies (1993).
In the gilded age of financial excess, countries around the world have learned
overtime to navigate around the battle between neo-American capitalism and the
German high-tax, high-skill model. They have been apt in defending their own eco-
nomic cultures while defending their institutions. In a way no one exactly predicted,
divergence has become the global trend-line where many countries have followed
markedly different trajectories. The British pattern has moved closer to the U.S.
model than the German as British jobs and industries have gone off shore and wage
rates in blue collar jobs have tumbled. Germany, with its high wage industrial sector
and strongly regulated economy, is a world leader in industrial exports. The Scan-
dinavians remain big spenders with very strong redistributive labor market prac-
tices focusing on retraining with generous replacement income. Even small Denmark
has developed a distinct consensus model of decision-making. It emphasizes coop-
eration and compromise among the social partners and has worked to society’s and
its corporate champions’ advantage to increase competitiveness and social cohe-
sion. The French and Spanish have developed a hybrid model of protectionism,
state interventionism, with strategic privatization of many state enterprises, and
selective tax cutting (Crouch, 2005). In 2007, France created more jobs than the United
States and unemployment was at a 30-year low. German unemployment tumbled
from double digits to just over 7 percent in 2007 before European Union (EU) growth
slowed dramatically in late 2008.
CANADA: HOW DIFFERENT IS ITS ECONOMIC CULTURE?
Canada’s economic culture and its importance to strong economic performance re-
quire a fuller explanation. In a recent paper, the distinguished economist Edmund
Phelps has provocatively explored why a country would choose to stick with inef-
ficient institutions from a purely market perspective while not optimally harmo-
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nizing its policies with its largest trading partner (2006). Neo-classical economists
have been quick to criticize the so-called inhibiting values and attitudes embedded in
collective bargaining, social policy, and other institutional guarantees. These “pro-
tectionist” kinds of regulations could be thought to deter or hamper good econom-
ic performance. Phelps argues that the values and attitudes often entrenched in the
economic system are as much a part of it as the laws of supply and demand.
Traditionally, neo-classical economics had no place for cultural elements other than
private ownership as part of its theoretical model. Phelps contends that countries have
differing institutions because “they have different economic cultures causing them
to prefer different systems of institutions” (2006: 3). He underscores the importance of
regarding a country’s economic institutions as proxies for the prevailing culture. These
institutions will have a mixed character composed of market and social institutions.
Economic culture is critical to the way particular capitalist economies are organized
because not all goods and services can be bought and sold in a capitalist society.
Divergence in varieties of capitalism can be explained by examining the ratio
of the availability of non-negotiable goods to negotiable goods and the preponder-
ance of mixed goods available. Mixed goods like access to information and a clean
environment are a benefit to society and the individual and are dependent on public
sector activity. The puzzle for the theorist is that a mixed good is a blend of use value
for society and exchange value for market transactions. It also is a bridge between
the state and the market on the one hand and the individual and collectivity on the
other. So, an ample supply of non-market goods is a net benefit for society for rea-
sons elaborated in Lefebreve’s theoretical writing, which argues that they always
help organize public life in all of its complexity (Lefebreve, 1996)
In many countries, particularly in urban settings, inequalities in access to good
education and affordable healthcare are now immense. By providing equality of
opportunity through education and health care, public authorities are able to level
inequalities. Access to education and acquiring social capital through skill training
are two of the most important factors in reducing the gap between the rich and the
poor. Only a properly functioning state has the responsibility to equalize the life
chances of all regardless of income, gender, and status (Crouch, 2005).
The Keynesian welfare state’s contribution to providing education and health
care to all its citizens is well known (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Mixed goods such as
public services and transfer payments are a wedge issue that hand governments a
powerful redistributive lever with which to develop best practices like social equi-
ty, innovation, and reducing the income gap.3
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3 Under the Lisbon Treaty the EU intends to harmonize tax policy and further reduce the orbit of national
sovereignty. But the decisive Irish vote against ratification threw a spanner into the carefully orchestrated
CANADA’S EXPERIENCE WITH A MIXED GOODS REGIME
Canada is a case book study of both these imperatives in the lives of Canadians. The
building blocks of Canada’s market for mixed goods began to appear in the 1940s
with far-reaching entitlements including unemployment insurance (1940), farm
allowances (1944), and in 1957, hospitalization and old age insurance. These trans-
fer programs were followed in 1965 by the upgrading of Old Age Security and the
expansion of the Canada Pension Plan; in 1966 the much needed CanadaAssistance
Plan provided crucial federal grant funding for provincial expenditures and the
Guaranteed Income Supplement to Old Age Security was introduced. A revised
and more generous Unemployment Insurance Act was passed in 1971, followed by
a new Family Allowance Act (1973), and the Child Tax Credit (1978) to reduce child
poverty in low-income families. The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms provided
Canadians with a complex set of legal and social protection for linguistic minorities,
First Nations and individuals, which went significantly beyond the provisions of
the Canadian welfare state of the time. The ratio of new and old mixed goods to ne-
gotiable goods has been large and significant for the last five decades in many key
sectors even with substantial declines due to privatization and spending cuts:
Compared to the U.S. type of market exchange, in many areas of public life Can-
ada has an “un-American transactional mode of distribution.” Canadians look to the
state to lower transaction costs, while U.S. voters have not abandoned their prefer-
ence for the market and the free enterprise system for setting things right (Hardin,
1974). Americans spend 7.1 percent of GDP on income security measures compared
to 11 percent for Canada, a massive difference of 3.9 percent (see table Breakdown
of Canada-U.S. Program Spending by Function, 2001). This category is comprised of
all social assistance, including employment insurance (EI), elderly benefits, refund-
able tax credits such as the general sales tax (GST) credit and the Canada Child Tax
Benefit, and outlays relating to Canadian public pensions/Quebec public pensions
(CPP/QPP), workers compensation benefits, veterans benefits, and motor vehicle acci-
dent compensation (Kennedy and Gonzalez, 2005). Programs like these do themost to
reduce the harm that derives from income inequality. More than a quarter of Canada’s
GDP is spent directly or indirectly on redistribution and protecting the social bond.
For a very long period, Canada has relied heavily both on income taxes and
income transfers to contain and reduce inequality. These instruments have made an
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plan to deepen the EU. The “no camp” convinced a majority that the Lisbon Treaty failed to protect Irish
concerns about abortion, taxation, and neutrality, all of which can be considered public goods connected to
Irish identity and its public policy culture. The “dissent Irish” has forced Europeans to think long and hard
about the need to defend diversity in their ranks at the highest levels of EU decision-making.
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important difference regionally and for low-income families. The poorest 25 percent
of Canadians are better off than their U.S. counterparts, and when Canada’s system of
transfers is added to market income, the regional impact is often huge. When mar-
ket income plus transfers are counted together, “one quarter of Canadian families
are better off than their U.S. counterparts in terms of purchasing power” (Wolfson
and Murray, 2000: 3).
BIG DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER IN PUBLIC SPENDING
Particularly since 2000, public spending on equalization transfers and transfers to in-
dividuals and families have continued to have significant redistributive effects (Cale-
don Institute for Social Policy, 2006). Poverty rates in Canada are about one half
Breakdown of Canada-U.S. Program Spending by Function (2001)
(% of GDP)
Function U.S. Canada Gap
Income security 7.1 11.0 3.9
Housing and community services 0.5 1.4 0.9
Economic affairs 3.2 3.5 0.3
Recreation and culture 0.3 1.0 0.7
Education 6.2 5.9 -0.3
Health 6.7 7.0 0.4
General public service 1.9 1.9 0.0
Public order and safety 2.2 1.9 -0.2
National defense 4.0 1.2 -2.8
Total program spending* 31.9 34.8 2.9
Non-defense program spending* 27.9 33.6 5.7
Total program spending in U.S. and Canada 27.8 31.4 3.6
* Several adjustments must be made to these figures to reach the national accounts measure of
total program spending.
Source: Kennedy and Gonzalez, 2005.
those in the United States, and the contribution of social market in Canada explains
much of the difference. Canada’s political institutions such as federalism, the four-
party political system, and the executive role of government have had continuing
relevance in reducing many of the negative externalities of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Drache, 2008). Even with the hard political right turn
with the election of Stephen Harper in February 2006, the Canadian taxpayer has
supported a larger state with marginally higher taxes, and bigger social programs
and transfers than U.S. citizens (see table below).
Arguably, the Canadian public has rediscovered the importance of the eco-
nomic role social Canada plays in Canadian politics and the fabric of the country.
The high ratio of mixed to market goods is much in evidence in key areas of public
life. Health, education, housing, mass media, workplace representation, and urban
transportation are not purchased like any other commodity. Rather they are part of
a social contract between government and citizenry. For this reason Canada has done
much better in learning to reconcile the efficiency of markets with the values of
social community.
Home Ownership
Canadians are very attached to the notion of home ownership, and strictly speaking
ownership is a market, not a mixed good. The innovative 10- and later 25-year mor -
tgage at affordable rates for working families introduced by the Canadian Mortgage
and Housing Corporation (CMHC) after the war –and quickly adopted by Canada’s
private banks– put home ownership within reach of the majority of immigrants as
well as the native-born. Later CMHC insured mortgages for high-risk individuals with
low down payments against default. The number of Canadians owning their own
homes remains significant in all major urban centers, and different levels of govern -
ments have a direct say in the regulation of the housing market. 
By 2006, home ownership was at its highest level in a generation. Sixty-eight
percent owned their own homes, up from 65 percent three years earlier, in part made
possible by the introduction of 30-year mortgages with relatively low monthly pay-
ments. Rents are regulated to varying degrees by local and provincial authorities
that protect existing tenants against unregulated rent hikes. The Canadian housing
market has held together quite well, and Canada’s sub-prime mortgage market is tiny
compared to the United States. Only 4 percent of mortgages are sub-prime com-
pared to an astonishing 40 percent in the U.S. Certainly Canada’s mortgage market
is less competitive than the United States, and only a handful of large Canadian
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banks dominate. Government regulations limit foreign competition in this sector and
risky mortgages in Canada are hard to negotiate and come by. This is not the case
in the United States as the sub-prime crisis has revealed to the chagrin and shock of
the U.S. public. 
As many as 12 million Americans are “underwater” meaning that their mort-
gages are worth more than their homes. Moody’s, the financial ratings company
estimates that more than 8.5 million Americans will default on their mortgages be -
tween 2008 and 2010. They warn that 5.2 million of them will lose their homes
(Globe and Mail Nov 12 08). Canada’s distressed home owners are not in this league.
Other differences are significant. Condominiums in Canada have to be pre-sold be -
fore financing is available; in the U.S., thousands of homes and condos are built on
spec and, with the collapse of the housing market, developers have had to dump
their product, driving down house prices even further. 
Urban Transport
Urban transportation is another area subject to extensive public regulation and where
mixed goods provisions are highly visible and also in decline. In the 1980s, mixed
goods plummeted in this key sector when Canada’s national airline was privatized
along with much of the publicly-owned rail system. Significant parts of the national
rail grid were dismantled. You can no longer take a train from Newfoundland to Van -
couver Island. Large parts of rural Canada are without any plane or rail service.
Intercity buses have taken up the slack, but even this level of service is inadequate to
provide highly efficient service linking communities and businesses within the coun-
try’s metropolitan regions. Spending on public transportation is at historic lows. In
Montreal and Toronto, with mass transit systems, the consumer is shouldering an
increasingly large share of the costs. 
It is paradoxical that Toronto spends less public funds per rider than New York
and Chicago. Toronto’s subway system has stagnated and not dramatically expand-
ed to serve the Northwest corridor where millions in the greater Toronto area live
but do not work. In the principal Canadian cities, transportation is a public utility paid
for by public funds, taxes, and passenger fares. However under-funding by public
authorities and the lack of long-term commitment to upgrade and improve public
transportation systems have pushed urban Canada toward a U.S.-style system of
public transportation over the last four decades. 
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Mass Media
In the areas of electronic and print media, the market plays a very prominent role,
and the Northern model converges with many practices in the U.S. variant. Budget
cuts by preceding Liberal governments have marginalized the capacity of the Ca -
nadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) to produce prime-time Canadian program-
ming in line with its non-commercial mandate to produce programs in both official
languages to strengthen the national identity. Instead the network has relied on
prime-time U.S. imports of sitcoms, films, and global sporting events such as the
Olympics to make up for the lost revenue. Canada’s private TV networks broadcast
largely films and U.S. programs and sports. They enjoy large audiences and are prof-
it centers. By comparison to the CBC, they are a major conduit for the importation of
U.S. mass culture and television programs into Canadian homes. 
Still, sustaining the Canadian identity remains a major responsibility of Ca nada’s
public broadcaster. CBC radio remains popular and listened to by millions of Cana -
dians. Its national news broadcast is seen as authoritative and with its foreign cor-
respondents reporting around the world, Canadians expect a “Canadian view.” One
of the more innovative decisions was to create CBC Newsworld, a 24-hour news channel
offering Canadians an alternative to CNN and BBC World. Despite the national broad -
caster’s importance, Canadians are major consumers of U.S. films, music, sitcoms,
and news services for much of the news and entertainment coming into their homes.
Universal Health Care
In the spheres of education and health care, brand capitalism Canada is somewhere
between the social democratic European model and brand  U.S.A. with the privati-
zation by stealth of services and under-the-radar-screen expansion of quasi-private
hos pitals provincially over the last 15 years. The anchor point is the universal health
care system that experts reckon has the single largest impact on reducing health ine -
quality. By contrast, the U.S. health care system is famously inefficient ranked thirty-
seventh by the World Health Organization (WHO). Its idea of health care effi ciency
is largely a fantasy.
U.S. health status with respect to infant mortality, preventive care, and access
to doctors falls below the standard in many industrialized countries in the global
North such as France and Germany. Most revealing is the fact that as many as 60
million Americans who are either uninsured or underinsured. Private insurers exer -
cise more invasive control over doctor selection, treatment and eligibility than any-
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thing comparable in Canada. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), private
care-for-profit, the type of management care in the U.S., impose limitations on indi-
vidual treatments that they deem “unncessary” and disqualify individuals on the
grounds of a “pre-existing condition.” For-profit care in the U.S. model has become
a nightmare for families and individuals with chronic and difficult diseases. With
individuals facing gigantic bills for health care, personal bankruptcy is not uncom-
mon. Canada’s national health system enjoys an iconic status which no government
has been prepared to challenge head on in the name of privatization.
Compared to the much more costly U.S. model, Canada’s health care is both
efficient and universal and costs Canadians just under 10 percent of GDP annually.
Health care privately purchased but paid for out of public revenues is guaranteed
as a right and is the most important example of a public good for all Canadians.
Landed immigrants, political refugees, and the homeless are all covered by the Cana -
dian Health Act. The general populace reveres it as Canada’s most popular gov-
ernment program. 
Public Education
Private schools are at the margins of Canada’s provincially publicly run education
system but have grown in recent times as Canada’s wealthy families have opted out
of the public system. Still, education is a public good without equal. About 10 per-
cent of school-age children are enrolled in the private education sector. Sectarian
religious schools are for the most part privately financed and not subsidized by taxes
with the exception of those in Alberta and Ontario’s Catholic public school system.
The latter was a result of a political compromise in the early twentieth century and
topped up with more funding by the Ontario provincial Liberals. 
In the October 2007 provincial election, the McGinty Liberals trounced the
provincial Conservatives who campaigned for state support for private parochial
schools. Voters massively rejected it. The victory marks the first time in 70 years that
Ontario’s Liberals have managed to win a back-to-back majority. In Ontario, the
heartland of Canada’s multicultural society, the election outcome confirmed that im-
migrants expect to be educated in the public system, are critical of giving public funds
to support private religious and secular private schools, and are strongly support-
ive of broad access to health care as a right.4
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4 In 2007 the miserable showing of Ontario Conservatives’ in the provincial election was blamed on its
leader’s decision to make public support of private schools a major campaign plank. The Conservatives were
soundly defeated by the Liberals who won almost 65 percent of the seats and 42 percent of the votes. 
Work Place Representation 
In the areas of labor market practice and workplace representation, the Northern
model diverges significantly from the United States. Democracy is one of the most
important public goods and industrial democracy in the workplace is one of its mo d-
ern success stories. Collective bargaining provides an upward pressure on wages
through regularized collective bargaining that gives families over time an increased
standard of living. Equally, it constrains the power of the employer to hire and fire
at will. When institutionalized in the late 1940s in Canada, collective bargaining was
a revolutionary idea because modern management had to give “cause” when dis-
charging an employee. An aggrieved employee has the right to challenge the dis-
missal and a labor court can order reinstatement (Drache and Glasbeek, 1985).
In the United States, these entitlements and practices of industrial democracy
have largely disappeared with the union-free workplace. Less than 10 percent of
private sector workers are unionized, and the number in key sectors like auto and
steel is expected to decline further. Job security is not part of the new U.S. flexible
labor market model premised on unchallengeable management rights to dismiss
and contract out work. By contrast, the Canadian labor market is regulated through
workplace bargaining and provincially-based labor codes. With 80 percent of the
public sector unionized and about 15 percent of the private sector unionized, the
number of workers covered by collective bargaining in Canada is very large compared
to U.S. jurisdictions. In the recent period, wage militancy has declined, but trade
unions are a major force, particularly in the Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia
economies. With explosive growth in the part-time, casual labor force, Canada has
imported some of the most controversial U.S. anti-union labor practices. But booming
resource economies and squeaky, tight urban labor markets in Calgary, Vancouver,
and Regina have maintained an upward pressure on wages and working condi-
tions across provincial boundaries. 
THINGS PUBLIC AND WHAT CANADIANS BELIEVE
Compared to the U.S., there is a lot of public authority in Canada, and Canadians have
come to expect it. In an era when markets predominate public thinking, governments
have been forced to pay more attention to the continuity in values documented by
Michael Adams (2003), Frank Graves (2001), and others that show that Canadians
are not viscerally anti-state and anti-tax. According to Frank Graves of EKOS, who does
polling in both countries, Canadians are much less ideological than Americans. His
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studies reveal that U.S. voters are more conservative, more ideological, and more
religious. He says that Canadians have become “non-ideological and non-partisan.
[Canadians] have the weakest political party affinity in the Western world” (quot-
ed in Valpy, 2008).
Like many other respondents in the Michigan World Values Survey, unsur-
prisingly, Canadians distrust their politicians but are supportive of a strong role for
government and its programs. For instance, asked to rate the top ten most impor-
tant issues in January 2008 in a Globe and Mail/ Strategic Counsel poll, Canadians placed
taxes close to the bottom of their priorities along with terrorism. The level of taxa-
tion is not one of their major complaints. The most popular program is hardly a sur-
prise; the top rated is Canada’s public health care system, and for a majority of
Canadians protection of the environment and action on global warming is their
number one priority. If polling data is an accurate predictor of Canada’s political
culture, Canadians are not ready to abandon the advantages of the Northern model
as they know it for a hard-right political public agenda with fewer mixed goods and
dramatically fewer public goods.5
As the table below confirms, government in Canada is bigger, more redistrib-
utive, and more activist in the social market than its U.S. counterpart. The puzzle is
that these differences have persisted despite two decades of privatization, govern-
ment cutbacks to many programs, and significant cuts to corporate taxes. Canada’s
social market economy is smaller and less redistributive than its counterpart in
Northern and Western Europe. But the Canadian equivalent is still significant and
comes with a history of many ups and downs. It is instructive to look at it briefly. 
5 Attitude toward strong positive government intervention is reflected in changing Canadian voting pat-
terns. The Liberal brand is strongest in Ontario and the Maritimes but the Liberals have lost their grip on
Québec since the early 1980s to the separatist Bloc. It has been a quarter century since their huge majority
there gave them the seats to be the natural governing party. In the West the Liberals are a fringe party with
declining support able to elect only a handful of MPs. By contrast Harper and the Tories own the West elec-
torally with the NDP having pockets of support in British Colombia (BC). Alberta, with its wealth and politi-
cal culture, is the closest to the Bush’s social conservatism and religious right. With a fractured political
system the regional dimension of Canadian politics is very strong. Voters in Québec and Ontario as well
as urban BC are distrustful of the corporate Hayekian agenda of the Harper government. Harper has not won
any seats in Canada’s largest urban centers where over 60 percent of Canadians live. One consequence is
that Canada has been pushed into minority-government mode following the revelations of the Gomery
Commission into the Sponsorship scandal. Until 2008, the Harper government remained stuck in the mid-
30s in approval ratings in public opinion polls tied with the Liberals led by Stéphane Dion who is per-
ceived to be a lackluster leader. A snap election was called in September 2008 and the strong performance
of the Bloc and the NDP denied Harper his majority.
MOVING THE CENTER TO THE RIGHT
In the 1990s, Canada’s political landscape veered to the center right. Canadian voters
seemed to have opted for the Anglo-American prototype of markets first, people
second. Market Canada’s tough deficit-cutting policies first emerged with the Brian
Mulroney Conservatives and were adopted with even greater vigor by the Jean Chrétien
Liberals in the landmark 1994 federal budget when Paul Martin was the Minister of
Finance. Government program spending was cut as much as 40 percent over three
years in a frenzy of deficit reduction. These policies systematically and successfully
reduced the scope and ambit of the redistributive framework of Canada’s complex,
multi-tiered system of transfer payments to individuals, families, and governments. 
Ferris and Winer (2007) demonstrate that the size of government, one of the
differences between Canada and the United States, has radically closed since 1995.
They estimate that the neoliberal discipline on government spending in Canada has
transformed the face of the Canadian government. Government spending in Ca nada
shrunk closer to U.S. levels. They do admit, however, that Canadian social transfers
as a percentage of the GDP are consistently greater than those in the United States.
For the entire post-World War II period, Canada’s expenditures have been roughly
25 percent greater than the United States (Ferris and Winer, 2007).
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Comparing Canada and the United States - Public Finance Snapshot, 2006
Total general Total general General Social Net saving Net lending
government government government security of general of general
revenue  expenditure final consumption transfers government government
expenditure
% of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
Canada 40.7 39.3 19.3 16.8 2.2 1.4
United States 33.1 36.6 16.0 12.0 - 2.5 - 3.5
Source: OECD, 2007
* Consolidated government expenditure
REINING IN PUBLIC SPENDING
Nonetheless, the Northern model was downsized and put on a strict regime of de f -
icit and program cutting. It is estimated that as much as US$50 billion dollars in
health and social spending were eliminated after the Liberals took office in the early
1990s. Ottawa became focused on competitiveness, market openness, and private
wealth creation, adopting much of the inner logic of the neo-American model. The
pendulum in public spending that has always vacillated in different periods be -
tween social and market Canada moved sharply toward the market end of the spec-
trum and appeared to be permanently anchored there.
Researchers discovered that when successive federal governments adopted
strin gent cutbacks and reduced Canada’s social security net, Canadians did not
wantonly abandon their ideas of equity and fairness in the name of global compe -
titiveness. National differences between Canada and the United States remained
rooted in the formative historical events that shaped their values to the present day.
In his magisterial study Continental Divide (1990), Seymour Lipset referred to
Americans as being “anti-statist, individualist and populist” while Canadians were
presented as being “deferential to authority, collectively oriented and statist” (quoted
in Boucher, 2005). Why has this fault line remained such a definitive statement of
Canada- U.S. differences in many respects when the Canadian and U.S. economies
were experiencing unprecedented pressure for integration?
According to the research of White and Nevitte the proportion of Canadians
who identified with “Canada as a whole” rose from 30 to 40 percent between 1981
and 1990 and remained just below 40 percent in 2000 (White and Nevitte, 2008, 400).
Americans and Canadians became more nationalist and attached to their nation-
state, not less.6 In the Pew Survey, Canadian values again sharply departed from
the U.S. in terms of moral permissiveness with respect to gay rights, interracial marriage,
abortion, immigration, and the role of the state in the economy. 
Adams reported that in his study of Canadian values in 2005, 41 percent of Amer-
icans replied that father was the master of the house, up from 31 percent in 1995.
The contrast with Canada was stark, with only 17 percent agreeing that father was the
undisputed master of the family in 2005, a precipitous drop from 33 percent a decade
earlier.(Adams, 2006) In fact, in a way that astonished many Canadians, who saw
themselves as deferential and very cautious compared to their  U.S. cousins, some-
thing unique had transpired: Canada had exchanged roles with the  U.S. as the North
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6 Mexicans also became noticeably more nationalistic during the golden years of NAFTA. See White and
Nevitte, 2008.
American center of small ‘l’ liberalism with its values of redistribution, solidarity
with the most vulnerable, and a strong belief in community. White and Nevitte ex -
plain this value shift first and foremost by the continuities in Canada’s “resilient
domestic economic structures” and political culture. 
With the arrival of the Bush revolution in foreign and domestic policies, Cana -
dians have continued to support a strong social democratic set of values of inclu-
sivity, diversity, and solidarity. They do not have a visceral, anti-state attitude like
their U.S. neighbors. The driving idea in the Canadian Constitution of “peace, order
and good government” effectively translates into a strong attachment for taxpayers’
dollars to be spent liberally on public goods as the previous tables demonstrate. What
is impressive to these students of Canadian public opinion is that “NAFTA has not
resulted in a movement towards more neoliberal values” (White and Nevitte, 404).
Canadians embraced deficit cutting, but they were equally committed to more pro-
gram spending. Is this not the strongest evidence of the way domestic structures are
powerful predictors of both social values and voting practices?7
THE NORTHERN MODEL: A WILDERNESS OF SINGLE INSTANCES?
In other areas of public life, the Northern model has proved unusually vulnerable
to the intense pressures from globalization and neoliberal policies. Deep integration
through NAFTA as championed in the many studies of Michael Hart and others pro -
mised an economic revolution for hard-pressed Canadian businesses (Hart, 1995).
The trade agreement challenged the regulatory role of the Canadian state as exclu-
sive manager of the national economy. Canada’s business culture has in turn been
transformed by the cross-border movement in goods and services. Their research
led them to predict that access to the U.S. market would build a group of world-class
Canadian corporations and that competitive pressures would eliminate the Ca n -
ada-U.S. productivity gap of more than 10 percent. Neither happened. In fact, the
gap tripled, rising from Can$3000 to Can$48 800 on a GDP-per-capita basis. 
On the ground, Canada’s entrepreneurial culture seemed to have been often
fatally weakened by the new competitive conditions. Since 2000, a total of 12 percent
of the market value of Canada’s core companies has been sold to foreigners. The
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7 It is intriguing to speculate on why Canadians have become less conservative in their social values but
also more skeptical about fixed political loyalties. University of Toronto polling expert Larry LeDuc has
found in a recent study that four in ten Canadians identify with the political center, another third with the
Liberal party, and a significant minority with the social democratic NDP (Valpy, 2008). As the left-right
binary has become less pronounced Canadians vote for issues as much as for a leader, which creates much
volatility and uncertainty at election time.
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blistering pace of takeovers accelerated after 2003 with the sale of some of Canada’s
largest and oldest corporations to foreigners including INCO, STELCO, Falconbridge,
Bell Enterprises, the Bay, and DOFASCO (Stanford, 2008). Instead of an industrial
competitiveness revolution, powerful market forces transformed Canada’s com-
parative advantage in an unprecedented direction. Canada became, once again, one
of the world’s leading producers of rocks, logs, agriculture, and energy.
The fundamentals of market Canada have also changed dramatically post- NAFTA.
Ontario’s world-class U.S. and Japanese auto makers now assemble more cars than
Michigan. Ontario has the densest concentration of car production probably in the
world, and automobiles, the economy’s second export-driver, represents 16 percent
of Canada’s merchandise exports. Domestically, auto production stands for be tween 3
and 5 percent of the economy. In the past, with an aggressive 63-cent Canadian dol-
lar, Canadian exporters were able to ring up huge profits with the currency advantage,
low health care costs, and competitively marketed goods. This strategy’s su ccess
helped pay down the debt and allowed governments to cut corporate taxes. In late
2007, when the Canadian dollar reached par with the U.S. currency, Canadian busi-
ness lost its biggest safety net.
In the last three years, over 250 000 jobs have disappeared from Canada’s man-
ufacturing industries in Ontario and Québec auto parts and small manufacturing
firms (Lin, 2008). Job losses and the number of plant closures are unprecedented.
Border towns like Windsor, once the hub of Canada’s auto industry, and smaller
centers outside of Montreal, are experiencing double-digit unemployment (TD Eco -
nomics, 2008). With Chinese auto producers planning to enter the North American
car market in the next five years, it is projected that Ontario’s share of North Amer -
ican auto production and auto parts industries are likely to shrink even further. 
In his major study of Canada’s productivity crisis, free market advocate Roger
Martin contends that the productivity gap grew larger, not smaller, as the theory of
free trade warranted (see table Canada’s Growing Prosperity Gap). Comparing Ca n -
ada to the U.S., Ontario, Canada’s industrial heartland, ranks 16 out of 18 on his
competitiveness ranking index, just ahead of Michigan. Ontario has been slipping
badly as one of North America’s industrial hot spots. From the right side of the
spectrum, nonetheless, he advocates more cuts to corporate and business taxes to tilt
Canada’s taxation system to a value-added tax basis. The idea is to create what he
calls an “entrepreneurial advantage” (Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity,
2008). The proposed framework is very far removed from any kind of a state-cen-
tered industrial strategy.
CANADA’S UNCOORDINATED LIBERAL ECONOMY: 
A DECADE OF RETRENCHMENT
The distributional consequences of the state’s smaller role in the economy and Ottawa’s
retrenchment as a provider of mixed and public goods has been much analyzed.
The Center for the Study of Living Standards reported that the growth in median
before-tax income stagnated between 1980 and 2005. The earnings of Canadians, like
Americans, stopped increasing in pace with the overall economy (CSLS, 2007). The fi g-
ures for the two countries are relatively comparable. Between 1975 and 2005, the U.S.
economy grew by almost 86 percent, but family income increased only 29 percent and
most of it between 1993 and 2000. The big change for Canadians came after 2000 when
family income in Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal, and much of the Maritimes grew
anywhere from just over 3 percent in parts of the Maritimes to almost 9 percent in
Alberta. In Toronto, the picture was bleak with an increase of only 0.7 percent for fam-
ilies recorded. 
The crucial point is that Canadian family income has stood still or gone back-
wards for those in the middle of the income pyramid, and the income for those at
the bottom has actually shrunk as mixed and public goods have been in short sup-
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ply with far fewer benefits for families and individuals. For working Canadians, the
1990s was a decade of despair and income retrenchment. The most worrying fact is
that despite persistent change in taxes and benefits to low-income Canadians, mar-
ginal tax rates for low-income Canadians have returned to 1992 levels (Poschmann,
2008: 4). The Keynesian , post-war unemployment insurance program was renamed
Employment Insurance in 1996 by the Liberal government of the day. The new name
reflected the neoliberal focus on workers as clients and customers not the connec-
tion to a full employment obligation on the part of government. Canadians eligible
for benefits shrunk from a pre- NAFTA high of over 70 percent to just under 40 per-
cent. Benefits were reduced and qualifying times were increased. In this area more
than any other, Canadian policy converged with the much lower U.S. levels.
The mix of government revenues also changed beyond recognition in this peri-
od of retrenchment. Ottawa’s single largest source of revenue to pay for the business
of government and social programs comes from the Goods and Services Tax intro-
duced by the Mulroney government. As many experts acknowledge, corporate in -
come tax as a share of government revenue has shrunk from a post-war high of 30
percent to around 10 percent (Brooks and Hwong, 2006). Of equal significance, the
gap between the rich and poor grew disproportionately even though Canada’s eco n -
omy performed better in 2000 than in the previous decade. More Canadians are
working longer hours, but unlike the golden decades of Keynesianism, the bottom
half have been shut out of the economic gains from North American integration.
Armine Yalnizyan has looked in detail at the gap between the rich and poor. In
terms of after-tax earnings, between 1976 and 1979, the bottom half of Canadian
families accounted for 27 percent of total earnings. By the end of 2004, their share
of total earnings had dropped to 20.5 percent (2007).
There is yet more to this story. In this depressing picture of Canada’s new com-
petitive condition, the poorest 20 percent of Canadian families have suffered a sharp
drop in the earnings pie, from 4.5 percent in the late 1970s to 2.6 percent at the be -
ginning of the new century. New data from latest census reveals just how meager
the increase in national median earnings measured in constant dollars has in fact been.
Between 1980 and 2005, earnings grew only 0.1 percent. Canadian multiculturalism
has not escaped the arc of growing income inequality. Recent immigrants are more
disadvantaged and face more labor market barriers than at any time in the last quar-
ter century. 
New Canadian census data reveals that in 2005 Canadian-born males with a uni -
versity degree earned Can$62,556 compared with Can$30,332 for a recent immigrant
earner in constant 2005 dollars. Canadian-born women with a university degree
earned Can$44,545 and immigrant women with a university degree Can$18,969.
Michael Valpy, reporting on the spiraling “income gap” found that university-edu-
cated, immigrant men and women earned 50 percent less than their Canadian coun-
terparts (Valpy, 2008). The only silver lining in this otherwise grim account of
inequality growth is the degree of social protection embedded in Canada’s tax sys-
tem for the most vulnerable. Yalnizyan concludes emphatically that almost two mil-
lion families would have been worse off than their counterparts in the late1970s
without government intervention and the protection of social Canada (2007). 
CANADA’S COUNTER-CYCLICAL SOCIAL MARKET: 
THE SOCIAL STILL MATTERS
Recent attempts to measure the historical size of Canada’s social market have pro-
duced some remarkable findings on this critical issue. In their detailed quantitative
study, Ferris and Winer found that Canada’s transfers to individuals have always been
larger that those in the United States: “from 1960 to 2004 the U.S. measure rose from
28 percent to roughly 38 percent of GDP, whereas Canada’s government size grew to
over 38 percent” (2007: 179). What is also significant is that the growth of govern-
ment expenditures on persons and businesses is largely driven by the business cycle;
so, just as the theory envisages, growth in social market transfers followed the oil
shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s. 
One need not look for simplistic explanations, but there is a strong correlation
between downswings in the business cycle and the growth of Canada’s social market,
at least until 1994. To extrapolate further, at the present time of deep integration,
government spending on public and mixed goods is likely to increase gradually to
address structural adjustments for industries and workers arising from competitive
labor markets and fallout from global competitive pressures. Ottawa speaks appro v -
ingly of investing in skills and job training though the amount of money dedicated
to this end remains inadequate by OECD standards: out of 30 or so countries Can -
ada rates in the bottom tier. With huge annual fiscal surpluses in recent times, in
theory Ottawa should be entering a new spending cycle.
While government spending on social programs is a key indicator of quality of
life, it is not the only one. The size of government in the economy is important be -
cause it indicates the resources and priorities that government spending measures
reflect. A country with a large social market does better at poverty reduction and
providing protection for its most vulnerable. The evidence supports the idea that
the Northern model has enjoyed some success in this critical area but only to a lim-
ited extent. 
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The National Council of Welfare in Canada has tracked and documented po ver-
ty reduction extensively. Between 1980 and 2005, poverty rates for seniors fell from
34 percent to 14.5 percent. It is quite remarkable to note that poverty rates for the
working poor remained largely stable during that period rising from 13.3 percent
of the population to 15 percent despite the fact that working incomes are lower today
than they were in 1986, once adjusted for inflation. Child poverty rates, for those 18
years and younger, have declined slightly from 16.2 percent to 15 percent, largely
as a result of the Child Tax Benefit. Many social advocates are worried, and rightly
so, that the after-tax income gap remains a real concern for low-income families. For
Yalnizyan and other social policy experts, Canada’s tax and transfer system makes
the critical difference: “Canada’s tax and transfer system stopped the free fall of
incomes for almost half the population raising children” (Yalnizyan, 2007: 4).
Leading Canadian scholars have analyzed the market dynamics of the U.S.
model demonstrating just how different the two societies have become. The top one
million U.S. households received 18 percent of the total income of all Americans, a
figure up almost four percent in 2003: their income share was roughly equal to that of
the bottom 166 million Americans all together. Analysis of the report showed that,
like in Canada, middle- and low-income families are seeing that their slice of the pie
is not growing and is even visibly shrinking. A more fulsome explanation is that
almost half of the income going to the top one percent of American families comes
from tax cuts on long-term capital gain and dividend payouts. In a way that does
not surprise Canadian and European researchers, much of the increase in wealth for
the super-rich came from tax cuts rather than market gains, although it is difficult
to separate the two (Krugman, 2007).
THE STRANGE CASE OF MACRO-ECONOMIC UNCOUPLING
IN A HIGHLY INTEGRATED MARKET SETTING
Since 1990, market Canada has witnessed a number of dramatic changes to its eco-
nomic performance and to the structural dynamics between the Canadian and U.S.
economies. The two economies, which were supposed to move in regular and pre-
dictable lockstep, are increasingly out of sync with respect to a range of leading macro
indicators. Here, also, the ratio of mixed to private goods is significant. Many of
these macro trends have caught the attention of Canada’s policy community. It is this
evidence that has led some business economists to argue that the Canadian and U.S
economies have at least partially decoupled, with different structural dynamics pre s -
ent in each. The line in the sand between the two economies is surely that of the
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pivotal role of natural resources in terms of wealth creation, exports and wages and
profits. In the words of Stat Can’s chief economist Philip Cross, profits have doubled
in the export sector since 2002 and since 2004 “natural resources have accounted for all
of the growth in Canada’s export earnings.” (2008) The decoupling hypothesis is im -
portant because it speaks to the ability of the Canadian economy to remain resi lient
in the face of  U.S. weakness and find its own path. It highlights growing regulatory
divergence like in the sub-prime mortgage market, but in many other areas as well.
For example, Canada is more of a goods-oriented country than the United States.
Almost 25 percent of Canadian workers are in the goods production sectors; while
the figure is just 16 percent south of the border. Canada continues to be more ori-
ented toward manufacturing than the United States with a 12 percent employment
share compared to 10 percent. The most important difference is that national re -
sources and mining are just 0.5 percent in the United States; the Canadian share of
employment in forestry, fishing, mining, oil and gas is almost four times the U.S.
size. As an investment magnet for foreign direct investment, this pivotal sector is in
a league of its own. 
According to Stats Canada, business investment in it has increased faster than
the rest of the economy since 2002. Investment has jumped from 36 percent to near-
ly 44 percent in 2008. In terms of job growth, resource-rich Saskatchewan, Alberta,
BC and Newfoundland and Labrador have outperformed Ontario and Quebec, once
the locomotive of the Canadian economy. The resource sector has become a virtual
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job machine for all parts of Canada outside the central region (Lascelles, 2007). Just
how dramatic the provincial differences have become can be seen in the table on
nominal GDP provincial growth rates. Canada’s resource curse has become a blessing
for the once have-not provinces of the Confederation. In a recent note, Mary Webb
writes that “for eight out of the ten provinces for the year ending March 2008, they
had a combined provincial surplus topping $11 billion” (2008).
All of the above structural differences translate into some significant policy
divides. Canadians remain temperamentally more cautious than their American
counterparts. The capacity for debt and risk is much higher in the United States than
in Canada. Consumption in the United States represented a remarkable 71 percent
of the GDP in 2000. By contrast, Canadian consumption represents just 60 percent of
GDP, and debt levels are much lower. 
Only a handful of countries along with Canada have enjoyed this kind of fis-
cal surpluses as the result of very different kinds of dynamics. In 2007, Germany and
France joined this select club.8 Canada has been a member for a decade running
huge surpluses after cutting programs in the early 1990s. Canada’s resource “curse”
has also supported a resource boom and generated significant tax royalties both for
Ottawa and the resource-rich regional economies. 
HIGH TAX RATES FOR THE MOST VULNERABLE AND
A NEW CENTER OF GRAVITY
Certainly Ottawa is spending more on a regime of mixed goods, but Canadians are
being more heavily taxed for these entitlements, new money for the Child Tax Be nefit,
a partial restoration of cuts to universal health care and new funding for educa-
tion.9 In a recent report, the C.D. Howe Institute found that, adjusted for popu lation
growth and inflation, federal taxes “have never been as heavy as they are now on
individuals and families.” Marginal tax rates on low income Canadians remain high
and have actually increased due to clawbacks and benefit reductions for those re -
ceiving welfare (Poschman, 2008). The Harper government continues to cut business
tax rates and the GST, evidence for the cynical observer that at heart Canadians are in
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8 Australia under John Howard and now Kevin Rudd has amassed huge surpluses. Despite the strong
neoliberal turn and a frontal attack on collective bargaining rights, Australia has the highest minimum
wage of OECD countries.
9 If public opinion polls are to be believed, Canadians regard the tax burden to be part of their identity
along with multiculturalism and diversity. In the Globe and Mail/Ipsos poll of February 2008 as well as an
earlier Globe and Mail/Strategic Council poll, January 2008, when asked what they considered the most
important issues, only 3 percent of respondents said that taxes were too burdensome.
many ways similar to their U.S. counterparts, partial to being tax-lite and resource-
dependent.
The Northern model’s economic center of gravity is now anchored by the glob-
al resource boom for Canada’s resource and energy products. Canada has benefited
massively from it. Net profits in oil and gas have grown by almost Can$30 billion
since 1999. Minerals and base metals have generated vast profits for Canada’s resource
giants, but the largest are now foreign-owned. Resource super-profits have fuelled
the Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and British Columbia economies. Ca n -
ada’s booming western provinces have reached full employment status with only
3 percent of the work force jobless. Only Newfoundland is at double digit unem-
ployment, but this may also change with the development of the vastly rich Hibernia
oil field off the coast of the belle isle. The gravity-based rig sits on the ocean floor,
111 meters high, and is designed for year-round production capable of withstanding
the impact of sea ice and icebergs. Despite its resource wealth and innovative suc-
cess in providing social Canada with the means to pay for a mixed goods economy,
Canadian public opinion is divided about the future of Canada’s natural bounty:
public curse or lucky country? 
The current decade has marked an important turning point in Canada’s eco-
nomic development. In the words of Jim Stanford, “Decades of promoting a more
diversified and less resource dependent economy have been reversed” (Canadian
Auto Workers, 2008). Canada’s economy has once again become dependent on nat-
ural resources as the motor of growth, export revenues, corporate profits, and new
investments. Right up until the late 1990s, Canada’s economy had acquired a greater
diversity in production and exports, and its manufacturing sector had developed a
capacity to produce more complicated goods and services. 
By 2007, the proportion of Canada’s resources consisting of unprocessed or mi n-
imally processed staple products expanded to nearly 60 percent (Cross 2008). Not
surprisingly, Canada’s exports to China followed the identical mix of specializing
in raw material exports; rising sales of metals, fertilizers, iron ore, nickel, wood pulp,
wheat, and coal –a veritable shopping list of Canada’s natural bounty. In a study
done for Statistics Canada, the most important finding was that Chinese imports of
Canadian crude materials have more than tripled since 1998, accounting for nearly
one-third of total growth in Canadian exports to China. 
The energy sector by itself is massive and diverse, comprised of six sub-indus-
tries: oil and gas, coal mining, electric power generation, transmission and distribu-
tion, petroleum and coal by-products, and pipeline construction and transportation.
Metal mining, forestry, and agriculture round out the spectacular diversity of Canada’s
resource abundance. Some experts call the mega role of resources a “curse” because
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of its distorting effects on income and productivity growth. If natural resources were
once evidence of a dependent economy, it is questionable whether the classic “sta-
ples trap” as developed by Harold Innis, Canada’s pioneering political economist,
is relevant as the appropriate critical lens to grasp fully the dynamics of the Northern
model (Innis, 1995; Watkins, 2006). 
But it would appear that the Canadian economy has returned to its historical
trajectory as an exporter of primary goods with a declining role as an industrial power.
In contrast to the classical model of staple production where a single global com-
modity, such as wheat, square timber, or cod in the earlier times, predominated, Ca n -
ada is in a privileged position because with record high prices for a range of energy
and mineral products, resource exports command top dollar almost from coast to coast. 
In a recent paper, Stanford notes that the job boom in resources including min-
erals and agricultural exports offset less than one-fifth of the jobs lost in Canadian
manufacturing facilities (Canadian Auto Workers, 2008). The big winners in terms
of job growth are private services and government. The private sector accounts for
almost two-thirds of all Canadian jobs while government at all levels accounts
for another one-third. Indeed job growth has been so strong that Canadian unem-
ployment had fallen to the lowest level in 35 years until the collapse of financial mar-
kets in 2008. Many in these privileged sectors have seen significant per capita income
gains. Certainly there are many part-time and contingent jobs in food and tourism, but
the jobs and income growth in government, resources, and high-skilled work has
been impressive, at least in the short term. Relatively high-wage jobs in public-sec-
tor, resources and the information economy co-exist with de-skilling and increases
in lower-paid employment in manufacturing and services. By 2010 for the first time
ever, Ontario will become a recipient of equalization payments from Ottawa, pub-
lic funds that go to “have-not” provinces. A record number of job losses combined
with the toxic effects of de-industrialization have meant a historic downgrading of
its status inside the federation.
In a way that no one could have predicted, the incredible growth in services
challenges one of the standard assumptions of globalization: that Canada is becom-
ing more integrated into the global economy. Most service production is consumed
domestically and virtually all public services are not traded. It is remarkable to note
that only higher-end health and education services, call centers, and banking ser -
vices are not consumed where they are produced. Stanford makes the compelling
case that the most remarkable structural change in the Canadian economy is that
Canada was less integrated in world markets at the end of 2006 than it was a decade
earlier measured by intense export openness. He documents that Canadian exports
reached their peak at over 45 percent of the share of Canada’s total GDP in 2000; by
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2007, this had declined by 10 points to 35 percent. What needs to be analyzed in
greater detail is the consequences of this double movement, de-globalization in the
service and information economy with intense globalization in resources and man-
ufacturing exports (Canadian Auto Workers, 2008). 
CANADA’S RESOURCE CURSE AND THE APPRECIATION
OF THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
Economists note that Canada’s energy boom is mainly a price effect. Andrew Jackson
draws attention to the fact that real output in Canada’s energy sector lagged behind
the rest of the economy between 2003 and 2007, and that productivity in this key
sector has yet to generate significant increases in output. In a recent article, “The Role
of Natural Resources in Canada’s Economy,” Cross underlines that resource indus-
tries have not been an important source of productivity or job growth. They are a
magnet for foreign investment, but output growth in mining, forestry primary met-
als has actually fallen since 2002 (2008). Energy-related construction growth is one
of the big winners from record high growth rates as thousands have moved to Alberta
and bought homes. 
But Alberta has done little to mitigate the boom-bust cycle and attract long
term industry to the province. Norway has used its US$375-billion sovereign fund to
implement social and political policy at the corporate level. Thirty years ago, in a
major study commissioned by the Manitoba government, Eric Kierans urged pro -
vincial governments to capture the rents from mining and other resource activities
that leased public lands for resource extraction. No Canadian jurisdiction adopted his
primary recommendation for public stewardship. Presently, Alberta has rejected the
notion that it needs to capture resource rents like Norway and spread the windfall
returns over a long time period. Alberta’s take from a $60 barrel of bitumen from the
oil sands is one of the lowest royalty regimes in the world at 30 cents a barrel and
it permits corporations to deduct royalties for federal corporate income tax purposes
(Jackson, 2008).
The immanent danger that Canada faces as a nation from a laissez-faire mega
resource boom is that appreciation of the real exchange rate can damage a country’s
exports and harm its long-term growth prospects. Economists Max Corden and Peter
Neary termed this danger “the Dutch disease” after the discovery of North Sea gas
in Holland in the 1960s (1982). It explains the loss of competitiveness when its man-
ufacturing industries were sideswiped by an unfavorable rising exchange rate as the
price of oil spiked. It led to a large inflow of foreign investment and a surge in resource
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exports. Imports rose and de-industrialization was seen to be a direct consequence
as a nation’s goods industries decline from the mounting resource boom. 
Many economists have argued that the shift away from manufacturing is detri-
mental to the economy as a whole. Once the resource boom runs out of steam, compe -
titive industries are slow to return, and there are far fewer benefits from techno logical
growth in the non-booming sectors. There are only two alternatives. One is to slow
the appreciation of the real rate of exchange, and the other is to boost the manufac-
turing sector’s competitiveness by a mix of specially designed measures.
THE BRAZIL STRATEGIC MODEL OF RENT APPROPRIATION: 
WHERE IS CANADA ON THIS STRATEGIC QUESTION?
The third option is to increase mixed goods and use the vast revenues from oil and
gas wealth for broad-based public ends. Norway’s government fund sold its close
to US$1 billion stake in Rio Tinto’s Grasburg mine in West Papua when it discovered
that the Grasberg mine would cause “severe long-term environmental damage in
West Papua.” Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Chile have spent boom revenues
for poverty alleviation and broader macro-economic goals. In 2007, Mexico spent
US$19 billion in fuel subsidies. Mexico’s huge oil reserves, owned by the nation,
supply the government with more than 40 percent of its revenues for public pro-
grams. The effects of public ownership of this strategic sector are felt throughout
society. The price of a liter of gas at the pump is at least 30 percent cheaper than in the
U.S. due to the complex formula the government uses to set domestic prices (Thomson,
2008). As part of the Mexican model of mixed goods and services, the government
also relies on subsidies to corn producers to stabilize prices and give families some
protection against soaring food prices. Calderón has recently suspended import tar-
iffs on rice, wheat, and corn to lower the potential for social unrest where 40 per-
cent of the 100-million-plus population live in poverty. Its strategic control of this
key sector stands in sharp contrast with its inefficient tax system: its gross take from
taxes is one of the lowest in Latin America.
By contrast, the Brazilian government is planning in 2008 to use its revenues from
recently discovered oil fields to create a sovereign wealth fund to help stabilize its
currency. The model is one of shared production where reserves would remain the
property of the government and the oil companies would be allotted concessions on
what is known as a risk basis and, critically, pay royalties on the revenue they earn.
The oil companies have been critical of this model because the government would
benefit from every increase in the world price for oil and would leave Brazil’s reserves
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in control of the nation. Lula is determined to change the royalty scheme to one based
on the Norway model where the state is the sole owner. It would have partners and
have to pay them but it will be the lead investor (Wheatly and Hoyos, 2008).
It is expected to have US$100-US$200 billion as a counter-cyclical contingency
reserve in the next five years. The aim is to use its financial resources to reduce pub-
lic debt and the inflationary impact of government spending. Brazil also has a sys-
tem of fuel subsidies in place to lower consumer energy prices. Chile already has a
sovereign fund holding foreign currency to reduce pressure on its currency (Wheatly
and Lapper, 2008). Sovereign funds can protect industries from heavy inflows of
speculative capital, a rapidly appreciating currency and provide financing to buy-
ers of Brazilian exports as well as funding for overseas investment for its firms. As
prices everywhere surge, southern governments cannot abandon households to a
muddle-through model. They have to walk a fine line between fiscal stability and
over-cooling the economy by moderating prices and salaries without choking off
consumption.
REVERSING DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
A first-world country like Canada that is seriously committed to successfully par-
ticipating in the global economy requires manufacturing industries with higher
productivity and higher rates of productivity growth. It needs to plan for its indus-
trial future. Late in 2008, French President Sarkozy has just created EUR 20 billion
fund to protect France’s core strategic industries from foreign takeover and the toxic
effects of the credit crunch. The state-backed fund would be among the 20 largest
long-term investment funds in the world, and its purpose is to help companies that
cannot find financing for their operations in the market because banks are too “timid”
and the state must act in France’s strategic interest. Certainly, his words could not
have been clearer and worth quoting. “The day that we stop building trains, air-
craft, cars and ships, what is left of the economy? Memories. I will not turn France
into a reserve for tourists” (Hall, 2008). 
No Canadian prime minister or ranking bureaucrat has even come close to
echoing France’s commitment to protecting and developing its core industries. The
strategic importance of a sovereign wealth fund is not on the agenda of Canada’s
Department of Finance.10 Canada has not found any way to combat the negative costs
of a rising dollar and the threat from commodity-driven inflation. Alberta and Ottawa
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10 Alberta has a heritage fund but has none of the policy leverage explicit in the Brazilian and Chilean
examples.
have used energy-generated surpluses to lower tax rates rather than take excess
revenues from the energy boom to invest outside the country or abroad. Ottawa has
dismissed the Norway-style sovereign-fund model on ideological grounds to let
continental U.S. interests shape Canada’s economic future. 
The idea of collecting and saving resource rents to plan for tomorrow up until
now is largely foreign to Canada’s public-policy culture. For instance, Norway’s fund
is worth about US$400 billion and is expected to double in size in the next decade. In
a far-reaching detailed 2008 report, the OECD is highly critical of Ottawa and Alberta’s
wasteful use of unprecedented resource revenues. It recommends that Ottawa use
its resource windfall to lower interest rates and stimulate the economy (Scoffield,
2008). So far Canada has spurned the idea of a fundamental course correction.
In the last four decades, higher growth in export-led industrial sectors has meant
that Canadian employers in core sectors pay on average 25 percent more than the
rest of the economy. Manufacturing accounts for over half of private spending in
research and development in Canada. But manufacturing employment has precip-
itously declined from 17 percent of total employment in 2000 to just 10 percent in
2007. Labor’s share of national income has fallen from 15 percent in 2000 to under
10 percent in 2007. Corporate profits have never been higher since they bottomed up
in the 2001 recession and with the crisis have plummeted in many sectors.
If the present vertically downward trajectory continues, the hollowing out of
manufacturing in Ontario and Quebec is a massive price to pay even if resource
Ca nada is booming. Canada’s share of technology-intensive industries –auto pro-
duction, aerospace, advanced economic software and other high value-added in -
dus tries– is much smaller than a decade ago and this has left its factory economy
structurally and competitively weakened. Most of all, the transfer of power to the
resource giants and the financial sector is troubling and problematic. Canadians
have yet to absorb the fact that Ontario’s economic performance and the weaken-
ing of its industries have pushed it into the status of a have-not province eligible for
equalization payments.
Political economists like Janine Brodie argue that economies are increasingly
undergoing rebordering and in the process are denationalized, a conceptual notion
to explain the importance of the local and regional in the national economy and the
growing role of the citizen in the public sphere (Brodie, 2008). The incipient idea of
broadening and deepening North America does not fit easily into this perspective.
There is no firm consensus to push North America toward a hyer-model of inte-
gration along EU lines. Indeed to the contrary, there is not a lot of evidence that
NAFTA has the capacity or coherence to force major changes on the foundational
practices of the three NAFTA partners. Most significant is the fact that the House of
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Commons Standing Committee on International Affairs and Trade concludes that
“the North American project, whatever it turns out to be, is still to be defined”
(Brodie, 2008: 450). 
The tense balance between social and market Canada is always on the razor’s
edge of Canadian politics and values and will remain so. Rodrik and many others
have challenged market-led strategies of wealth creation that play such a large role
in Canada’s Northern model on the grounds that they rely on mechanistic thinking
about global competitiveness and on the mistaken belief that the social costs of adjust -
ment can be handled by markets without strong government regulation (Rodrik,
2007). Their core idea is that there is no one-size-fits-all policy template. Canadian
policy experts may take comfort in the fact that institutional divergence is the pol-
icy phenomenon of our time and has many consequences if used to advantage.
What options are there for the taking? 
THE NORTHERN MODEL’S KEY LESSONS LEARNED
It is remarkable that despite the enviable growth record that Canada has acquired
among the G-7 nations, there is little national discussion about the best practices that
Canadian industry and labor need to adopt. Nor is there any indication of a new con -
sensus for a systematic institutional reframing of public management policy and
regional development in ways that would strengthen Canada’s capacity for inno-
vation and tap the organizational creativity of a mixed-goods economy (Marsh, 2008).
Canadian public policy has not turned this corner and invested in the very large
contribution knowledge regimes contribute to wealth-functioning market economies. 
Still, for Canadian families and individuals, brand Canada’s system of mixed-
goods transfers constitutes a major reality in their lives. The blending of use value
with exchange value for goods that are publicly delivered and reliant on public reg-
ulation are a defining part of Canada’s economic culture. Their strategic importance
forces us to rethink the somewhat simplistic idea that public spending is the only
litmus test of the public good. In an information age, social networks support new
actors capable of initiating systemic change as information is devolved downwards
(Drache, 2008). The dynamics of power have made publics both nervy and nervous,
capable of putting new issues on the public policy agenda.
For these important reasons, Latin Americans with strong populist and collec-
tivist traditions are not wrong to see similarities between their own resource-dom-
inated economies, global commodities booms, the need for fiscal transparency, and
democratic accountability. As globalization intensifies the movement of people, ideas,
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and information, the Northern model remains an unfinished social project with its
own complex dynamics and shortcomings for income redistribution. 
Further, in many countries, experience teaches that powerful export strategies
strengthen regional and national identities at the expense of a nationally integrated
economy. Hence the symbolic and real role for sovereign wealth funds for a re source-
rich Latin America and many other countries struggling to put in place effective
royalty regimes. The most difficult issue is to use these new instruments not only for
macro-stabilization ends but to eradicate poverty and rebuild two decades of pub-
lic infrastructure neglect.11
The decline in public support for more privatization and unregulated labor
markets has done more to shatter the illusion that Canadians and Americans are
destined to row together toward a common goal and set of understandings. The re -
balancing of deep integration with democratic politics becomes part of the strategy
to address the cost and benefits from growing economic integration. 
Canadians have become over time skeptical of top-down, universal solutions
giving markets a free rein. The economics of reform requires coming to terms with
the fact that Canada’s energy sector can no longer maintain its frenetic pace indef-
initely. Energy spiked at close to US$150 a barrel in the summer of 2008 and has
retreated to the US$50 range since then. The new price of under US$50 a barrel may
well become the operative benchmark in the aftermath of the crash of global neolib-
eralism in September 2008 and the US$2 trillion rescue package assembled by the
leading banks of the world. (By July 2009, it is reported that the global fiscal rescue
package has soured to US$70 trillion for the Eurozone, the United States and Japan.)
In a globalized world where interdependence has become the gold standard of eco-
nomic theory, countries in the hemisphere are trying to strengthen their long-term
economic performance. They are trying to nail down the elusive balance between
trade openness, inflation targeting, exchange rate volatility, and the need for effective
institutional reform. Smart public policy advocacy suggests that after a long and
intense period of globalization with the dislocating effects of intense supply-chain
management, countries are forced to find ways to strengthen domestic institutions
and enhance democratic participation. 
Indeed, the primary lesson that our story underlines is that brand Canada is a
highly unstable variety of capitalism. Canada, with 33 million inhabitants, belongs
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11 The bitter legacy of neoliberalism particularly for Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, is that the state’s capacity to
be an effective actor has been weakened further. To make a dent in a culture of indifference, government
needs to reform its tax capacity so that jurisdictions can equalize opportunity for the bottom millions and
pursue strongly focused developmental strategies. Governments starved for revenue have only the min-
imum to spend on reinforcing social cohesion.
to an elite group of nations with large surpluses, record levels of job creation in the
energy and information economy, an expanding public sector with significant job
hires, record low inflation and a tax system that anti-poverty activists concede pre-
vents two million low income families from falling into poverty. This mix of social
values, public goods, and high-value exports has helped maintain the precarious
balance between neoliberal market Canada and the redistributive impulse of social
Canada. Canadians themselves are not sure of its best practices, and while a coor-
dinated market economy model is preferable to one driven by short-term profits,
there is no strategic vision of where the Canadian economy should be a decade
from now. Canada with an embarrassment of riches may well become “a reserve
for tourism” with only a memory of global industries, to repeat Sarkozy’s acerbic
words. With the world’s financial system in turmoil, the need to become psycho-
logically attuned to thinking in collective terms is ever more pressing, and national
economic strategies have acquired newfound credibility and consequence.
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